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Abstract 
This paper discusses a new measure that is adaptable to certain 
intervalic probability frameworks, possibility theory, and belief theory. As 
such, it has the potential for wide use in knowledge engineering, expert 
systems, and related problems in the human sciences. This measure 
(denoted here by F) has been introduced in Smithson (1988) and is more 
formally discussed in Smithson (1989a). Here, I propose to outline the 
conceptual basis for F and compare its properties with other measures of 
second-order uncertainty. I will argue that F is an indicator of 
nonspecificity or alternatively, of freedom, as distinguished from either 
ambiguity or vagueness. 
1. A Measure of Nonspecifi city and Freedom 
Recenty, significant advances have been made in the formal 
representation of second-order uncertainty (starting with Shafer's ( 1976) 
belief theory and Zadeh's (1978) possibility theory). These developments 
followed on from earlier work in second-order probability (e.g., C.A.B. 
Smith 1961 ), and there have been attempts to unify the various 
approaches (e.g., Loui 1986, Dubois and Prade 1987, and Kyburg 1987). 
These new formalisms have brought into focus a new set of problems 
concerning the definition and measurement of various kinds of second­
order uncertainty. While various terms and measures have been proposed 
for second-order uncertainty, as yet the area lacks a widely accepted 
unifying framework. Moreover, it is not clear that all of the important 
kinds of second-order uncertainty have been defined and operationalized. 
In particular, nonspecificity has not been distinguished from vagueness or 
ambiguity (and the use of these terms in the literature is unsatisfactory). 
This paper presents a definition and measure of nonspecificity, denoted 
here by F. 
Without loss of generality, I shall introduce F in the setting of 
possibility theory. Accordingly, let p(E) be the probability of E. and let 
ne(E) < p(E) < po(E), where ne denotes necessity and po denotes possibility. 
In the absence of any further information about p(E) and its range of 
permissible values, we assume that p(E) has a uniform distribution over 
the interval [ne(E),po(E)]. A unimodal distribution of p(E) would be more 
specific than this condition, while a multi-modal distribution would tend 
towards ambiguity. 
An illustration should suffice to make this last point. Gardenfors and 
Sahlins (1982) asks us to consider Miss Julie who has been invited to bet 
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on the outcomes of three tennis matches. In Match A, she is informed that 
the play�rs are very close in ability and so she has good reason to believe 
that the probability of either player winning is close to 0.5. She is 
uninformed, however, about the players in Match B and so cannot say 
anything about the probability that either of them will win. Prior to Match 
C, she overhears someone remark that one of the players is extremely good 
but the other is a novice. Unfortunately, she does not know which player is 
the better one, so she cannot tell which way to bet. 
These are three quite distinct second-order probability distributions. 
Match A connotes a tight interval around 0.5. Match B indicates a uniform 
distribution spanning the [0, I] interval. Match C corresponds to a sharply 
bimodal distribution, with the distribution concentrated near 0 and 1. 
Clearly the distribution of probabilities in Match B is the most nonspecific 
of the three (in the sense of Max Black's 1937 paper), while Match A has a 
quite specific distribution. The distribution in Match C also is more specific 
than that for Match B, and corresponds to the usual linguistic or 
philosophical definition of ambiguity. Therefore, Klir's (1987) version of 
'ambiguity' is too inclusive; he fails to distinguish it from nonspecificity. 
We should not expect that the measures of 'ambiguity' reviewed in his 
survey would adequately measure nonspecificity (and indeed they do not). 
Under conditions where the second-order distribution of p(E) is not 
specified beyond its upper and lower bounds, or in ordinary possibility 
theory, it is reasonable to define a measure of relative nonspecificity by 
F = po(E) - ne(E) (1) 
which corresponds to Baldwin's (1986) so-called measure of 'uncertainty' 
in his support logic system. In Smithson (1988) I provide a frequentist 
rationale for F as a measure of the relative jr e edom of a collection of 
elements to 'choose' E or not. If, say, 15% of a collection of people must use 
their automobiles to get to work, and 75% of them could possibly do so, 
then the percentage who are 'free' to choose whether or not they will use 
their automobiles to go to work is 75%-15% = 60%. 
More generally, consider M options, denoted by Ei, 1�i< M. The 
definition of F must take into account the restriction that the Pi must sum 
to 1. A geometric representation of this system is a M-1 dimensional 
simplex whose edges are defined by the sum-constraint. The poi and nei 
remove 'slices' of this simplex, and F may therefore be defined as the 
proportion of the volume remaining (a proof is given in Smithson 1989a): 
M M 
FM == (1 - I,nei)M-1 - � max (O, 1-pOi-I,nej)M-1 
i=l � jf:i 
i=l 
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+ � 2.: max(O, 
.£..i J>l 
i=l 
M 
..... + (-t)M-1 � max(O, 1-nei-LPOj)M-1 
£..J j#i 
i=l 
For example, for M = 3, we have 
F3 = ( 1-net-nez-ne3)2 - max(O,l-pot-ne2-ne3)2 
- max(O,I-po2-net-ne3)2 - max(O,I-po3-net-ne2)2 
+ max(O, l-pot-P02-ne3)2 + max(O,l-pot-po3-ne2)2 
(2) 
+ max(O,l-po2-P03-nei)2 (3) 
Figure 1 displays a geometric representation of F3 as the area left in 
the triangle defined by Pl +p2 < 1 when the poi and nei are taken into 
account. Clearly FM attains 1 iff for all i poi = I and nei = 0, which 
corresponds to total nonspecificity (i.e., total ignorance from a subjectivist 
standpoint, and total freedom from a frequentist perspective). Likewise, it 
attains 0 iff for any 1, pOi = nei, or in other words when any of the Pi are 
totally specified. 
p2 
1 
p1 
0 ne1 1-po3 po1 1 
Figure 1. Three-Dimensional Example 
Let us compare FM with measures of so-called 'ambiguity' which have 
been proposed in the recent literature. One is due to Yager ( 1982 ), and 
may be written in a form following Klir (1987): 
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M 
AM = 1 
- L poi-yOi+ I (4) 
i=l 
where poi> POi+l for all i, and by convention pon+l = 0. The second is a 
generalization of Hartley's information theoretic measure (Higashi and Klir 
198 3): 
M 
IM = L(POi-POi+t)log2i (5) 
i=l 
While IM and AM are clearly monotonically related, FM IS not 
monotonically related to either of them. 
Example 1. For M=2, consider two cases: 
Case I. pot = 0.8, P02 = 0.4 (whence net = 0.6, ne2 = 0.2) 
Case 2. pot = 1.0, P02 = 0.4 (whence net = 0.6, ne2 = 0.0) 
In Case 1, A2 = 0.4, while in Case 2, A2 = 0.2. 
In Case 1, F2 = 0.2, while in Case 2, F2 = 0.4. 
Moreover, in terms of the 'latitude' represented in these two cases, F2 
yields results that are consistent with intuition while A2 's values run 
counter to intuition. 
Example 2. For M = 2, consider two cases: 
Case 1. pot = 1.0, P02 = 0.6 (whence net = 0.4, nez = 0.0) 
Case 2. pot = 0.7, P02 = 0.7 (whence net = 0.3, ne2 = 0.3) 
In Case 1, Iz = 0.6, while in Case 2, I2 = 0.7. 
In Case 1, Fz = 0.6, while in Case 2, F2 = 0.4. 
Again F2 yields values in line with intuition, while 1z does not. 
F M also increases whenever any pOi is increased, provided that 
m a x j ( n e j) < 1-poi for j not equal to i, or if at least one of the nej is 
decremented accordingly (which it has to be in order to maintain a 
consistent assignment of poi's and nei's). Otherwise, FM stays constant. 
However, for any M, IM stays constant when pot increases (it ignores pot 
by virtue of the fact that log(1) = 0). This is quite counterproductive if we 
wish to depend on IM as a measure of nonspecificity or freedom. For 
instance, it fails to distinguish the case {pot = p02 = po3 = 0.5} from {pot = 
1.0, po2 = po3 = 0.5}. In both instances I3 
= 
0.5log2(3 ), whereas F3 = 0.25 for 
the first case and 0.50 in the second (thereby differing by a factor of 2). 
It can be shown that FM is maximal only under total ignorance, and 
minimal for probability measures in any subset of the M options, whereas 
A M  and IM attain their minima only for the case where there is only one i 
such that poi = 1 and all other poj = 0. Clearly AM and IM are nonzero even 
when poi = nei for all i, as long as there is more than one i for which there 
are nonzero values. In that respect, AM and IM may fail to distinguish 
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mere first-order uncertainty from second-order uncertainty. FM , on the 
other hand, always attains 0 when there is no second-order uncertainty. 
One implication of the condition under which FM attains 0 is that for 
M>2, one needs to consider not only FM but also FK, where K runs over all 
subsets of M. Moreover, it may be useful in some applications to consider a 
conditional version of FK, in which the condition is that some proportion (p, 
say) of belief has been assigned in the form of pointwise (rather than 
intervalic) probabilities for some subset of M-K alternatives. Under that 
condition, a conditional version of FK may be defined by computing the 
portion of the volume of the right-simplex whose height is q = 1-p. 
Denoting this conditional measure by FKiq. we define it by replacing all 
occurrences of 1 in the major terms of (2) with q. 
Finally, we must be wary of comparisons between FM and FN. where M 
and N are unequal. As pointed out in Smithson (1989a), there is a 
connection between FM and the traditional statistical concept of 'degrees of 
freedom', in that FM measures the fraction of the total freedom that could 
be realized given M degrees of freedom as a maximum potential. Thus, the 
meaning of the magnitude of FM is conditional on M itself. A partial 
remedy for this incommensurability is to use SM = (FM ) 1/(M -1) as a 
'normed' measure, although even then we are still dealing with a measure 
of nonspecificity (or freedom) given M options. 
2. Effects of POi and nei on FM 
Whether FM is viewed as a utility (as in freedom) or a disutility (as in 
nonspecificity), it is reasonable to ask whether an change in the poi has the 
same effect on FM as an equal and opposite change in the nej. Given the 
choice, when should we make an effort to alter the poi and when should 
we concentrate on the nei? 
It can be shown (Smithson 1989a, Theorem 5) that changes m the nei 
have a greater impact on FM than equal and opposite changes in the POi 
unless the following condition holds: For some subset of the M options 
M-1 M -1 
whose cardinality is M-1, L,nei < 1 - LPOi. In that event, a change in pOM 
i=l i=1 
will have a greater impact on FM than an equal and opposite change in 
neM . Figure 2 shows an example for M=3. The left-hand part corresponds 
to a case where the above condition holds, and the right-hand part to a 
case where it does not. The shaded areas indicate the amount of FM lost by 
imposing po3 and ne3 , where 1-po3 = ne3. Clearly, in the left-hand instance 
p o 3 subtracts the greater area, while in the right-hand instance ne3 
subtracts more. 
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p2 
1 
po2 ...,...� ___ ,__......_ 
1 - p o 3  
0 po1 
po1 + po2 < 1 
p1 
1-ne3 1 
1-ne 3  
po2 
0 1-po3 po1 
po1 + po2 > 1 
Figure 2. Effects of ne3 and po3 on F3 
p1 
1 
It should be evident that for small M, the conditions specified above 
may not be uncommon, while for larger M it will tend to be rarer. In fact, 
in general this condition requires rather 'low' values for the pOi- The 
reason is that it implies the sum of the M-1 poi must be less than 1, which 
means that the requirement that the sum of all M poi be greater than 1 
would be achieved only by adding in the last, poM. 
3. Nonspecificity in Cross-Classified Systems 
In some kinds of applications we may wish to consider cross-classified 
systems. These are a special case of systems in which there are po and ne 
constraints on sums across subsets of the Pi· Consider a K-option system of 
Ei which is cross-classified with an M-option system of Ej. Let Pij denote 
the joint probability of Ei and Ej. and Pi. and P.j the respective marginal 
probabilities. Then� as Baldwin (1986) observes, given nei. < Pi. < poi. and 
ne.j < P.j < po.j. we have 
ne(neij) = max(O, nei.+ne.j-1) < neij < min(nei.,ne.j) = po(neij). and 
ne(pOij) = max(O, poi.+PO.j-1) < poij < min(poi .• PO.j) = po(poij). (6) 
Clearly it is of interest to evaluate not only the marginal nonspecificity 
measures FK and FM, but also the joint nonspecificity FKxM· The latter is 
not straightforward, and we do not have an explicit expression for the 
general case. However, there are practical algorithms for evaluating these 
measures (e.g., Cohen and Hickey 1979). 
Likewise, FKxM and, for that matter, the nonspecificity of individual 
pij, depend partly on the nature of the (in)dependence between the Ei and 
Ej. Let Dij denote the degree to which Ei and Ej are dependent, and define it 
by Dij = (Pij-Bij)/(Aij-Bij). where Aij = min(Pi .• P.j) and Bij = max(O, Pi.+P.j-
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1 ). Thus, Dij = 1 when Ei and Ej are maximally overlapped and Dij = 0 when 
they are maximally disjoint (note that Dij = 1/2 does not mean statistical 
independence, however). It can be shown (cf. Smithson 1989a) that the 
nonspecificity of Pij is maximized or minimized whenever Dij = 0 or 1, 
according to the following cases: 
Case 1: If nei.+ne.j > 1, then nonspecificity is maximized when Dij = 0 and 
minimized when Dij = 1. Moreover, this can occur only for one cell in any 
cross-classification of any size. For suppose nei. + ne.j > 1. Then l:nek. < 1 -
kl=i 
nei. and :Lne.j < 1 - ne.j , so :Lnek. + :Lne.j 5. 2 - (nei. + ne.j) < 1. 
ml=j kl=i ml=j 
.)e 2: If poi.+PO.j < 1, then nonspecificity is maximized when Dij = 1 and 
mimized when Dij = 0. This condition may occur for all cells if M and K 
oth are > 2. Otherwise, there must be at least one cell in the table for 
which Case 2 does not hold. Moreover, we should expect this case to 
become more common as M and K become large. 
Case 3: Suppose nei.+ne.j < 1 and poi.+PO.j > 1. Then if 1 - min(nei.,ne.j) >(<) 
max(poi..PO.j), nonspecificity is maximized (minimized) when Dij = 0 and 
minimized (maximized) when Dij = I. In larger tables, for reasonably 
evenly distributed Pij, one would expect that most of the time 1 - min(nei 
.
• 
ne.j) > max(poi .• PO.j). 
These cases demonstrate that the nonspecificity of cross-classified 
systems varies as a function of their marginal nonspecificity and the 
dependency between the Ei and Ej. This result has several implications for 
the evaluation of uncertainty in complex systems. First, the proliferation of 
this kind of uncertainty through time in a given system will depend on 
how tightly coupled its various stages are, as well as how unspecified the 
marginals are for each of those stages. Secondly, in systems where the 
dependency relations are not known, any sensitivity analysis of 
nonspecificity must include variations in dependency. 
4. Second-Order Uncertainty and Human Jud gment 
The foregoing discussion has introduced a new measure of second­
order uncertainty with an appealing rationale, distinct from second-order 
ambiguity and fuzziness. The measure has potential for many applications, 
and practical computing algorithms are available even for intractable 
cases. In closing, I should like to very briefly indicate a few implications 
and findings stemming from recent empirical work on F and its associated 
concepts of freedom and non specificity. 
First, a recent study (Smithson 1989b) finds that people are averse to 
second-order vagueness, nonspecificity, and ambiguity in the probabilities 
associated with gambles involving the prospect of gain. Therefore, we have 
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a second-order version of Ellsberg's Paradox. Secondly, current 
experiments suggest that, given a constant FM, a system's performance 1s 
evaluated more positively when nonspecificity is represented in terms of 
desirable outcomes (e.g., successes) than when it is represented in terms of 
undesirable outcomes (e.g., failures). Another indicates that the degree of 
nonspecificity itself is perceived as greater when represented in terms of 
possibility than when represented in terms of necessity (constraint). These 
results, although tentative, highlight the importance of furthering our 
understanding of human judgment and decision making when freedom or 
nonspecificity is a consideration, as well as the usefulness of a normatively 
defensible measure of nonspecificity .. 
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